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55 Ohio App. 351, 9 N.E. (2d) 891, 23 Ohio L. Abs. 361, 9 Ohio
0. 85 (1936). This case involved a set of facts similar to the case at
bar, the plaintiff having been bitten while attempting to separate two
dogs. The Court held that contributory negligence was no defense since
the liability was predicated upon the statute and not upon the negligence
of the defendant.
The phrase often used in dealing with cases of this nature that "every
dog is entitled to one bite" certainly needs to be qualified in Ohio. The
prevailing common law theory would say that he is entitled to one bite;
the Hayes case, that he is entitled to more than one bite; but under
section 5838 of the General Code, the unfortunate canine is entitled to
no bites at all. DAvm A. WIBLE
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION- AVAILABILITY OF COMMON
LAW REMEDIES FOR NON-COMPENSABLE OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASES
Smith brought an action in the Common Pleas Court of Marion
County for damages for silicosis caused by the negligence of his employer,
the Marion Brass & Bronze Foundry. In Cuyahoga County, on similar
facts, the administratrix of the estate of one Triff, a deceased employee,
filed an action for wrongful death against the National Bronze &
Aluminum Foundry Co. Demurrers were sustained to each petition,
which rulings were affirmed by the Courts of Appeal for the Third and
Eighth Districts respectively. Motions to certify were allowed by the
Supreme Court, which considered both cases in a single opinion. It was
held that the common law remedy of an employee against his employer
for occupational diseases, not compensable under the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act, has not been taken away by the organic or statutory law
of Ohio. Triff v. National Bronze & .lluminum Foundry Co., Smith
v. Lau, 135 Ohio St. 191, 2o N.E. (2d) 232, 14 Ohio 0. 48 (1939).
Thus, by a four to three decision, the court has directly reversed
its former position, as set forth in Zaiachuck v. Willard Storage Battery
Co., lO6 Ohio St. 538, 14o N.E. 405 (I919), and Mabley and Carew
v. Lee, 129 Ohio St. 69, 193 N.E. 745, IOO A.L.R. 511 (1934)-
This may be attributed to the shifting personnel of the court, rather
than to the inconstant attitude of any of the individual members. None
of the majority group was on the court at the time of the Zaiachuck
case, and only Judge Zimmerman sat in the Mabley and Carew case,
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in which he wrote a strong dissenting opinion. Judge Matthias, in
dissenting, maintains the position he took in the ZaJachuck and Mabley
and Carew, cases, and Chief Justice Weygandt has not changed the
decision he made in the Mabley and Carew case. Of the four new
members, Williams, Day, and Hart have aligned themselves with Zim-
merman, while Myers has joined Weygandt and Matthias. All three
of the dissenting justices have expressed their views in separate opinions,
which indicates the strength of their convictions on this matter.
Occupational diseases were not compensable in Ohio until 1921,
when Section 1465-68a, Ohio G.C., became effective. This section
contained a schedule of 15 diseases which were made compensable; this
number has been extended until it now has reached 22. Neither of the
instant claims is compensable, since the exposures occurred prior to the
addition of silicosis to the schedule. 117 Ohio Laws, 268 (1937).
Plaintiffs' actions are predicated on tort for the negligence of the
employer in failing to provide a safe place to work in violation of the
laws of Ohio, failure to notify the employees of dangerous conditions,
etc. The facts present two main issues: (i) Has an employee a right
of action at common law for negligence of the employer proximately
causing a non-compensable occupational disease? (2) If so, has this
right of action been taken away by the organic and statutory law of
Ohio?
In answering the first question in the affirmative Judge Williams
follows the overwhelming weight of authority. Gentry v. Swann Chem-
ical Co., 234 Ala. 313, 174 So. 530 (937); Ilurle's Case, 217 Mass.
223, 224, 104 N.E. 336, L.R.A. 1916A 279 (1914); Boal v. Elec-
tric Storage Battery Co., 98 Fed. (2d) 815 (Pa., 1938); Barrencotto
v. Cocker Saw Co., Inc., 266 N.Y. 139, 194 N.E. 61 (934);
Pellerin v. Washington Veneer Co., 163 Wash. 555, 2 Pac. (2d) 658
(1931). None of the dissenting opinions contests this point, although
there are dicta in Ohio which suggest the opposite view. Industrial
Commission v. Brown, 92 Ohio St. 309, 316, 11 o N.E. 744, L.R.A.
I 9 i6B 1277 (915); Zajachuck v. Willard Storage Battery Co., lo6
Ohio St. 538, 14 N.E. 405 (1919).
The chief controversy lies in the consideration of the second ques-
tion, which involves the interpretation of constitutional and statutory
provisions, specifically Section 1465-70, Ohio G.C., and Section 35,
Art. II of the Constitution of Ohio. The latter gives the legislature the
power to pass laws establishing a state fund for the purpose of providing
compensation to workmen and their dependents, for death, injuries, or
occupational disease, and further provides that "Such compensation shall
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be in lieu of all other rights to compensation, or damages, for such death,
injuries, or occupational disease, and any employer who pays the pre-
mium . . . shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or
by statute for such death, injuries or occupational disease . . ." Of this
Judge Williams says: "This section of the Ohio Constitution, in our
judgment, does not deprive the employee of the right of action growing
out of occupational disease in cases in which the disease was not made
compensable. The words 'for such death, injuries, or occupational dis-
ease,' dearly refer back to the prior language of the provision, and mean
death, injury or occupational disease for which compensation has been
provided by the statute. If the word 'any' had been used for the word
'such' in the phrase quoted, the meaning would have been much
broadened. An intent to narrow the meaning is therefore necessarily
implied by the reference to preceding phraseology."
Section 1465-70, Ohio G.C., provides: "Employers who comply
with the provisions of the last preceding section (Ohio G.C. sec. 1465-
69) shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or by
statute . . . for injury or death of any employee, wherever occurring,
during the period covered by such premium . . ." The majority argues
that, since this statute was enacted before occupational diseases were
made compensable, it could not have removed the common law right
of action. This interpretation is bolstered by the similar treatment of
closely analogous statutes in many other states. Jones, .dmx. v. Rhine-
hart & Dennis Co., 113 W. Va. 414, 168 S.E. 482 (1933); Berkeley
Granite Corporation v. Covington, 183 Ga. 8oi, 19o S.E. 8 (1937);
Barrencotto v. Cocker Saw Co., Inc., 266 N.Y. 139, 194 N.E. 61
(934); Downing v. Oxweld Acetylene Co., 112 NJ.L. 25, 169
Atl. 709 (I933), ioo A.L.R. 519 (936). The attitude evinced
by these courts is that the Workmen's Compensation Acts were designed
primarily to improve the plight of the disabled workman and his de-
pendents-not to assure the employer of immunity from open liability.
Another majority argument, stressed by Judge Zimmerman in his
Mabley and Carew dissent, is that to abolish the employer's liability at
common law under these conditions is to give him protection for which
he does not pay through contribution to the State Insurance Fund or
otherwise. No cost of underwriting non-compensable occupational dis-
eases is reflected in the premiums paid by the employer.
Each dissenting judge attacks the decision on different grounds.
Chief Justice Weygandt argues that it is unnecessary to construe the
language of Section 35, Art II, since the meaning and intent of the
amendment was fully agreed upon by a joint committee representing
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the employers and employees and set forth in a statement for the guid-
ance of the voters of Ohio. This statement recited the effects of the
amendment, among which were the wiping out of open liability and a
fixed limit of financial liability, thus protecting the assets and credits of
the employer. Weygandt also observes that none of the many decisions
cited by the majority involves the constitutional language here employed.
Judge Myers' contribution to the dissent is one of policy rather than
of construction. He considers that to so reverse a once settled issue is to
"play fast and loose with fundamental principles."
Judge Matthias contends that Section 1465-70, in the light of the
subsequently enacted Section 1465-6 9 b (which provides for payments
into the occupational disease fund) has completely abolished open liability.
He also fears that the majority ruling will open the gate to a flood of
litigation.
The view which the Supreme Court has now reached was advo-
cated by the writer of a note in this LAw JOURNAL, criticizing the unjust
effects of the Mabley and Carew decision. i O.S.L.J. 317 (i935). It
is submitted that the instant decision more nearly effectuates the general
purpose of the Act-to provide support to the disabled worker and his
dependents. See Note, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1074 (1934). To take from
the employee a long-standing common law right and give him nothing
in its stead cannot be reconciled with the motivating spirit and purpose
of the Act. "The employee should not be made to suffer by giving up
all his common law rights for an incomplete system of compensation,
unless an express provision makes this interpretation inescapable." Note,
3 Duke Bar Ass'n Journal, 96 (i935). Under the reasoning of the
majority opinion no such provision exists in Ohio. The argument that
the decision will create a flood of litigation should carry little weight,
since no action can be maintained without the establishing of the em-
ployer's negligence, even though proving such negligence has been facil-
itated by statutory standards. What justification can there be for
permitting violation of these standards with complete impunity?
The tremendous significance of the ruling is reflected in its imme-
diate consequences. The Ohio Manufacturer's Association, representing
the organized employers, and the American Federation of Labor, rep-
resenting the employees, went into conference and emerged with an
agreed bill, now before the legislature, which would close the open
liability in return for several concessions to labor. The proposed bill,
S. B. No. 297, would protect against open liability by amending Section
1465-70 to read: "Employers who comply with the provisions of Section
1465-69 shall not be liable to respond in damages at common law or
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by statute, for any injury, disease, or bodily condition, whether such
injury, disease or bodily condition is compensable under this act or not,
or for any death, resulting from such injury, disease or bodily condition
. . ." (writer's italics). In addition the amendment prescribes a six
months statute of limitations within which any action must be brought
for occupational diseases not heretofore compensated from the fund.
This is designed to limit the risk of suits at law for diseases contracted
prior to the effective date of the amendment.
Foremost among the gains for labor in the proposed bill is the exten-
sion of Section 1465-68a to cover all occupational diseases, which term
is defined as "a disease peculiar to a particular industrial process, trade
or occupation and to which an employee is not ordinarily subjected or
exposed outside his employment." Under the existing law compensation
for silicosis is to be awarded only if the employee has been subjected to
injurious exposure to silica dust, in his employment in Ohio, for periods
aggregating five years, and only then if the disability or death results
within one year after the last injurious exposure. Under the proposed
amendment to Section 1465-68a the required period of exposure is
reduced to three years, and the time limit after the last injurious exposure
raised to two years.
A new section, I4 65 -68d, proposes to establish a Board of Review
of three especially qualified physicians, to be appointed by the dean of
the medical school of Ohio State University, the director of the Depart-
ment of Health, and the Industrial Commission, each of which shall
have one vote. The function of this board is to hear appeals of occu-
pational disease claims which have been denied by the Industrial Com-
mission. Decisions of this board as to medical facts will be binding.
Little, if any, opposition is expected to impede the passage of the
proposed bill under an emergency clause. If it does pass the Triff
decision has enabled labor to achieve a long-sought objective, blanket
coverage for occupational diseases. Labor has definitely relinquished all
right to common law remedy in return for an apparently complete sys-
tem of compensation. Full coverage for occupational diseases, as dis-
tinguished from the schedule plan, has been adopted in a number of
other states in one of two ways: (i) by broad construction of the word
"injury," so as to include occupational as well as accidental injuries.
Mass. Gen. Laws (932) c. I52, sec. 26, interpreted in Johnson's case,
279 Mass. 481, 181 N.E. 761 (1932); (2) by specific statutory pro-
visions making all occupational diseases compensable. Cal. Gen. Laws
(Deering, 1931) Act 4749 sec. 3 (4); Conn. Gen. Stat. (930) sec.
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5223; N.D. Comp. Laws Ann. (Supp. 1925) sec. 396 a(2); N. Y.
Session Laws of 1935, c. 254; Wis. Stat. (1937) sec. 102.01.
It is submitted that the all-inclusive type of statute is preferable to
those which enumerate lists of compensable diseases. 16 Ore. L. Rev.
84 (937); Wilcox, The Schedule Fraud in Occupational Disease
Compensation, 24 Am. Lab. Leg. Rev. 119 (1934). That occupational
diseases occupy a relatively significant position in days lost ratings is
pointed out by Dr. Emery Hayhurst, Current Status of Silicosis and
Other Occupational Diseases in Ohio, Industrial Medicine, May, 1939.
The principal argument for discriminating in favor of certain specified
occupations and diseases is that the cost of full coverage is prohibitive and
too heavy a burden on industry. Whatever weight this objection has
ever had has been largely nullified by the experience of those states
operating under all-inclusive statutes. Rabinowitz, Compensation of
Occupational Diseases from a Legal Viewpoint, 12 Wis. L. Rev. 198
(1937). Should blanket coverage prove too expensive we may expect
a long-needed preventive movement, aimed at the elimination of the
causes of occupational diseases. Such a movement, in addition to being
socially desirable, should increase efficiency and improve employer-
employee relations.
JOHN R. YOUNG
